Part Eight
Anita Susuri: I also wanted to ask you a little about the period when, for example, the 1981 demonstrations happened in Kosovo, or the events like that which took place in Kosovo, how were they transmitted there?
Agim Gjakova: ’81 did not have any kind of reaction, nothing special. Anyway, since the military regime was established in Kosovo after ’81, there were those things, opposition and so on and so forth. But there were also such fools, this officer I told you about, “Come on,” he said, “come on,” he said, “what’s wrong?” He said, “What kind of officers we have here in the ministry.” “Hey man, what kind of officers do you have?” I said, “you took them.” “No,” he said, “I didn’t take them.” Do you know what one of them told me? “Alright, alright,” he said, “it’s good that the demonstrations happened,” he said, “but the Yugoslav proletariat’s celebration was ruined.” What an idiot (laughs). “It was ruined,” he said, “the celebration. The Albanians were demonstrating for that…”
The truth is that many of them did not speak much, because the assessment came from logical people and those who care, not from those who did it, because they still continue to say they did right. In history it is called a mistake. Why is it called a mistake? Because the demands were made in a completely premature way and in such a manner… it was perhaps prepared, I say this for myself. A friend from Peja comes to me, he had even taken his school-leaving exam together with my wife. “Uncle Agim,” he said, “a group of students has come from,” December, December ’80, “a group of students from the University of Prishtina,” he said, “and I don’t know how to answer them, so come you.”
I go. “Hey boys, what do you want?” He said, “Uncle Agim,” he said, “you will hear what we are going to do.” “So what are you going to do?” “We will,” he said, “we will shake it.” “Listen,” I told them… I understood that it was politically motivated, because ’68 had happened, there were court processes of Marxist-Leninist groups that were uncovered and so on and so forth. “I will tell you,” I said, “boys, an Arab proverb that says: before you enter somewhere, think how you will get out, because you may enter easily, but how will you get out, will you be able to get out? Therefore, before doing anything, think about what consequences it will have and how it will turn out.”
With those I knew, I don’t know if you have heard of him or might know him, Shaqir Shaqiri, professor of English, he finished English and did his doctorate with Edi Durami. He was telling me this and that. “Shaqir,” I would tell him, “when you return you will end up in prison.” “How, Uncle Agim, will I end up in prison?” He said, “Everything you told me, the UDBA already knows.” “No, prepare yourself,” I said, “because you will go to prison.” Shaqiri returned and they threw him into prison, clap {onomatopoeia}. I knew these tricks because they were done… I had even told another one in Germany, but they could not put him in prison because he was in Germany.
He said this and that. “Uuuu,” {onomatopoeia} I said, “you are sleeping uncovered, naked at night.” “How,” he said, “can you say that, Uncle Agim?” “These things,” I said, “that you are telling me,” because he was one of those who organized demonstrations at that time in the ’70s throughout Germany and throughout Europe. After six months they sent me word, “Well, you were completely right, because everything…” So when we met Shaqiri later, “Hey, Shaqir?” He came later in the ’90s, he had accompanied Ibrahim Rugova when he went to America as an English translator. “So,” I said, “Shaqir,” “Yes, they did put me in prison.” They had sentenced him about one year and I don’t know how much, who knows, at that time. Because when the ’90s began it was somewhat different.
So, as for ’81, since state security was also involved because they had inserted Marxist-Leninists and so on… at a time when in ’68 they opposed the republic, in ’81 Albania came out to demand the republic. When it was known that international politics was totally unfavorable, when the situation was totally unfavorable… but why precisely, precisely through the demand for a republic, to deny it, to erase this issue from the agenda. Therefore, we were against it, against this movement. I am not saying… in 2004 there was chaos here. The people who took part, 99% of them, against the Slavs, do you understand? As for who organized it, why they opposed, it is another matter. So that too.
And about ’81, I do not say that many among the youth were enthusiastic, most of them were, you understand, but at that time. If Kosovo had continued for another ten years as in the ’70s, today we would have had a state without problems, without such issues and without bringing in foreign security agents, whether French or God knows whose. So, they responded in Albania like that… they began to publish what the world was saying, not what the Albanians were saying. Three or four books were published, I don’t know, with different writings from articles that were written around the world about the events.
Anita Susuri: Mr. Agim, now I’m also interested in the death of Enver, Enver Hoxha…
Agim Gjakova: Yes.
Anita Susuri: And the changes that you noticed and that affected social life?
Agim Gjakova: With Enver’s death, that dictatorship which had been established like iron loosened a little. That is to say, it became a bit freer. There were no longer those arrests of people for agitation and propaganda and so on and so forth. The arrests were for theft and such things, corpus delicti as they say, things that happen all over the world, not only with us. A bit of a different, more democratic spirit was created, as they say, lighter. People began to breathe a little more freely. Nevertheless, it was not removed, because they were still there as before…
Ramiz Alia went to New York to the United Nations organization at the head of the Albanian delegation. What happened there in America, there are many suppositions. He may have met the Americans, he may have reached an understanding with them, because later he held a speech in the Bureau there and said that we were obliged to let go, to open the door to political pluralism. The bust of Enver was also toppled. There was no… here and there some kind of reaction, no, no, no counter-reaction, no arrests, no. Maybe some acted on their own account, but not like that. But even that, as they say, the documents should be made public now, but they still have not come to light, those things that were done even with his approval, you know. In other words, silence.
Because if the authorities had not wanted Enver’s bust to be toppled, they would not even have allowed people to approach it, they would not have let them near it; he was still in control, still in power. Anyway, it was toppled and democracy was established, and then one of the democrats came to me. He said, “Agim,” he said, “do you want me to tell you something?” he said. “You,” he said, “together with 28 people, were on the state security list to be executed here in the square as opponents of the regime.” I told him, “I don’t know about that list,” I told him, “but I know the other accounts that I’ve seen and experienced,” (laughs). So, they had prepared it… Simon Stefani was also among them, these were against it and against Ramiz, against this atmosphere that he loosened a little. Surely also Nexhmije, Nexhmije… once I told a Kosovar whom I just mentioned now, “Lady Macbeth,” a criminal, a criminal.
Then democracy came, in quotation marks as I call it, yes. Democracy came as it came. The Democratic Party was created. With Sali Berisha I drank coffee about 50 times when he was a medical student and a doctor. The Highlands of Gjakova, Gjakova, this somehow brought us closer… and he called me. The chaos began, they fled on ships and on those, the toppling of the bust and those December events. Arben Broci was killed in Shkodra, four people were killed, the security killed them. He said, “Agim, come, come,” he said, “we are creating a party.” I did not go. “We are creating the party,” he said. And for the second time, “Come on, come on.” Fine, I said, I’ll go once.
When I went, there were four or five people. I found two people, one of them had burdened us to death with the aesthetics of Enver Hoxha through his writings, the other was the son of a deputy state prosecutor and the deputy minister of this or that, overnight he had become a university professor and a party member, a democrat. Where are the real democrats, those who have suffered, who have taken beatings, who have gone to prison, who have borne all that? I told Sala, I said, “I’m not coming.” “Come on, come on,” as if inviting me to a wedding. When you speak about a party, I have created a party, but I went with concrete programs, this, this, this.
I told him, “I have Kosovo.” Until ’90–’91, you know what was happening in Kosovo, children were being killed and devastation was happening, destruction here, a very heavy situation. I said, “I will devote my energies to Kosovo. Albania,” I said, “has an independence, good or bad, but it has it,” I said, “Kosovo is very bad, very grave. Therefore, I will devote my energies to it.” I did not go.
Then one came and told me that they had proposed me as a deputy in the Has region. I told him, “No, I’m not going, I don’t want to.” After some time another came, “Why, Uncle Agim, didn’t you come? They always used to send us some Vangjel, some Papapavli, I don’t know who. Now one came,” he said, “from our area, you had 99% of the votes.” “No,” I said, “I am not for that, and also I was not in good health.” I did not accept to enter a political structure.
Anita Susuri: And in the ’90s, were you afraid to come to Kosovo?
Agim Gjakova: Huh?
Anita Susuri: In the 1990s, were you afraid to come to Kosovo?
Agim Gjakova: No, the system was still there, and it was even worse than before. Then Milošević took it into his hands. But the KLA emerged, it emerged like that… in 1998, when it became like a pre-offensive and hundreds, not to say thousands of young men fled, about 200 young men from Gjakova came. I organized them into a brigade; five young men from that brigade were killed. That remains a question mark as to how they were killed, where they were killed. Whether it was the mistake of the leaders, supposedly the clashes that took place up there at the front. Or even through betrayal, God knows, those things need to be investigated, but {shrugs}.
So I began organizing this. We held discussions, about 15–16 men from Gjakova, the others were like this, these were more like leaders, so to speak. “Do you want to enter Gjakova? I want to cross the border,” the power was still strong. There were 204,000 soldiers and police in Kosovo at that time. There was a very good young man, he was killed. He had come as a student, with the surname Qymyri. I asked him, “Do you know what a weapon is?” “No,” he said. He had never held a weapon in his hand. “How will you enter,” I said, “without knowing what a weapon is, without knowing how to use it properly? Without having one? Without being trained with the weapon? How will you enter Kosovo?” I strongly opposed it. “In no way.” “All right,” he said, “we’ll go but we’ll stay.”
There, someone mocked them, “Coward, chicken,” and so on. They were killed there and an ambush was set for about 50 people. They sat down to rest somewhere all night until morning. When they sat down to rest, they had about three guides, as they call them, local highlanders. They separated in one corner off to the side somehow. And just as they were resting, suddenly they were illuminated with a projector, pëm {onomatopoeia}. It turned everything into light and the machine gun opened fire. There, 12 or 13 people were killed. The others got up and fled. There was a Hasan Krasniqi who had a bus company in Gjakova. He had been hit by a bullet here {above the head}. I thought my foolish boys had all been killed. Thirteen people, because that was the number, 14–15. But no, others had also entered. Five from Gjakova were killed, not three. Two others were killed later.
I said… Hasan came, they had bandaged him here {at the head}, but it had not touched the bone, it had only torn the skin, that bullet. “Hasan,” I said, “thank God you survived.” “Uncle Agim,” he said, “your words came back to us,” he said, “but it was too late,” (laughs), “it was too late,” he said, “after the machine gun opened fire, your words came back to us,” he said, “the ones you told us. We entered,” he said, “into a pool of water,” it was March, no, early April, still cold in the Highlands, snow, you know, like that in the mountains. “We stayed in a pool of water all day, we froze, we froze, and we agreed to leave because we could not endure that cold in the water. But we endured as much as we could until night fell so that we could withdraw, to move away so they would not see us,” he said. And like that.
Anita Susuri: And when…
Agim Gjakova: Ahmet Krasniqi, whom they killed. He had called me twice. They had told him that I was… we spoke at great length. He agreed completely with that. I told him, “Ahmet, with this organization like this, even in ten years we will not defeat Serbia. Therefore, we must keep this in mind. Do we need to fight, do we need to prepare, here I completely agree, but not with adventures.” “I agree with you, Uncle Agim, I completely agree.” He did not want… “We will do,” he said, “what needs to be done now.” And in order not to leave undone what needed to be done now, they killed him as well, they killed him for many reasons.
I have personally seen the Americans with my own eyes, as I am speaking to you. They came to Albania. One of them was a little younger than me. He asked us, “Can Macedonia shelter 200 to 300 thousand Albanians?” To us, that seemed like nonsense, this question. When in Bosnia 200,000 were killed, in Kosovo they would have killed 500,000, why, are Milošević’s cousins and nephews our sons? But politics works with long-range shots, with those cannons, with those drones that fly. They had thought things through, they knew these things. Even the exodus that happened, when the Albanians were expelled, they had planned all those calculations. But they did not want the creation of a real army of Kosovo. Absolutely none of the Western states.
I realized that, or you recorded this or is it being recorded? Anyway, it doesn’t matter because I’ve said it even elsewhere… I realized that they did not want an army, because this army would cause them trouble today. They would not allow Thaçi to come to power in that way, or to be in power and act as he should. They did not want it. I am not speaking only about France and those who were against it, but not even the Americans. If you remember… I am neither pro-American nor anti-American. I told that American, no, another one. “Kosovo is a European country, but if we must choose an ally, I choose the United States of America. But there is one thing,” I said, “do not think that I can act more for America and love America more than Kosovo, no.”
These friends told me, “That’s why the Americans don’t approach you,” and to close the matter, “I don’t need them,” I said, “nor do I intend to go to America.” My daughter has been three or four times to America with her husband. And one day they were telling me, “Oh father,” she said, “you said this…” because I have said, I have written: Sarajevo, the nail of Nasreddin, and I criticized America, the American forces who left Sarajevo surrounded for one thousand days and people died for bread and other things, and America did not go. When Mitterrand went, only then did they remember and say stop, stop, because of the graves like that. The Americans went after one thousand days. Why did they leave Sarajevo like that for one thousand days?
In 1990 there was an article by the Military Institute of London, which is the most specialized institute in the world on military matters. I remember only three variants for Yugoslavia; I remember the third variant, which interested me the most. These were people like that… Western policy would let the nations of Yugoslavia clash with each other and fight and do whatever, and from these clashes, from this, the new borders of the former Yugoslav Federation would be structured. This truly happened, did it happen that way? It did happen that way. Slovenia fought… well, the Slovenians did not fight much, it happened quickly. Croatia fought, Vukovar was burned, destroyed, turned into devastation. Have you been to Croatia? [addressing Ana Morina] Anyway, were you young then or not involved at all?
Ana Morina: No, I wasn’t.
Agim Gjakova: How old are you?
Ana Morina: 25.
Agim Gjakova: She wasn’t even a child then. But you heard it from your parents. And so on with Vukovar and the rest. And Bosnia, don’t even ask what happened there, and so on. But with Kosovo the realization was different. Bush Sr. in 1992 came out and said he drew a red line for Milošević. In other words, do not commit genocide and such tricks in Kosovo because they will not be tolerated. Some say, “Ah, Milošević was an American agent.” He may have been, because he worked in America for several years in a bank and so on. He worked there. Who knows now. And the expulsions and so on… the expulsion, as a test, to test population movement, was also a test, a test. A tactical test, not to say a strategic one. A strategic test of the world.
Anita Susuri: I’m interested, after the end of the war, when you returned, what was that like for you?
Agim Gjakova: In Albania or here?
Anita Susuri: When you returned here in 1999.
Agim Gjakova: You’ve seen that book, Kosovo and the Written Word is Noble. That’s where the return begins. When I returned, I saw that no party was capable of forming a proper government as it should be. Do you understand me? Ibrahim Rugova convened the Assembly of Kosovo that had been elected during the war, during the 1990s. Jack Coughlin, Kushner’s deputy, sent an ultimatum: “By tomorrow at 4:00 p.m. the Assembly must be abolished,” the Assembly must be dissolved, “the post of President of Kosovo must be abolished,” which Ibrahim Rugova had been elected to. Ibrahim had no choice; that’s how it was done.
The GPA was created, the General Administrative Council. Among its members was also Rexhep Qosja, there were two people in the party (laughs). He didn’t even have a party. Why did he participate? Anyway. Rambouillet. Rambouillet had several very significant concessions and strategic mistakes. At Rambouillet, when those delegations were discussing matters there, they should also have discussed borders, the natural borders of the Albanians, and said that we Albanians extended as far as near Niš and that those were our lands. This was not even mentioned at all. That was a mistake.
The first question is: would it have been accepted? No, it was known. We discussed this in Tirana with the people who needed to know. It would not be accepted because politics would not allow it, but things would remain as they are now, with this Vučić coming out and presenting this and that. Things would remain like this and you would also tell international politics, “this is how it is.” That did not happen. Then there is another fact. Preševo, Bujanovac, and Medveđa until 1946 were within Kosovo. I don’t know if you know this. Serbia removed them, transferred them to Serbia, detached them and attached Leposavić with Serbs in order to change Kosovo’s national structure. So what I’m saying is… anyway, these are…
Secondly, with my political intuition, in Kosovo the power of the servants of foreign intelligence services was installed. At first, my friends did not accept this. Later, seeing the developments, they told me, “You were absolutely right.” The power of the servants of foreign intelligence services. Can this be heard in this room or not? Do you have anyone here from SHIK?
Anita Susuri: It’s our secret (laughs).
Agim Gjakova: Your secret? Anyway, I’ll say it regardless.
Anita Susuri: No, no.
Agim Gjakova: What is our intelligence here in Kosovo?
Anita Susuri: State intelligence?
Agim Gjakova: Yes, the secret service, what is it, how is it? Do you know?
Anita Susuri: No.
Agim Gjakova: No, you don’t know. Our intelligence is in five parts: the Americans, the British, the French, the Germans, and the Turks.
Anita Susuri: And why is it like that?
Agim Gjakova: In the early 2000s, I don’t remember the exact year now, it doesn’t matter, there were wiretappings in Kosovo. There were 60,000 wiretaps. Did you know that? No. Sixty thousand wiretaps, and of course I was among them too. Not just by one service but by several. I even caught one of them tapping my phone and confronted him. “What are you doing?” I said. “You’re tapping me?” “Yes, I am, it’s my duty.” I caught him red-handed, cornered him. He was Albanian; God knows what they had ordered him.
I said, “I am a public figure. Take the press, the newspaper where I worked, Bota Sot. You’ll find, starting with Thaçi, two articles: Hashim Thaçi in the whirlpool, Hashim Thaçi again in the political whirlpool.” Whirlpool meaning political vortex. I have never insulted or sworn at anyone. I have over 900 pages of political, cultural, and social analysis, telling truths. They once told me, “Write an article as if Faik Konica were alive,” with that title, and I quoted Faik Konica: “If Albania ever dies, then on the stone of her grave it should be written: idealists revived her, chance saved her, and politicians killed her.”
Does this also apply to Kosovo? And without insulting anyone. The late Ali Podrimja was alive then and came to me very concerned. At that time there were political killings. Over 600 political murders occurred. I don’t know whether you know this or not. Anyway, very worried. I told him, “Ali, I have lived through periods where I saw death with my own eyes several times.” My wife was there then. “So,” I said, pardon the expression, “for those dogs I don’t care at all.” I said it. I said that. Politicians are killing Kosovo little by little. If that so-called Association had not been signed, created, today Kosovo would not have these troubles. Vučić could demand whatever he wanted, it wouldn’t matter. You corner him.
Do you see Borrell, anti-Kosovo; Lajčák, anti-Kosovo; regardless of how liberal they present themselves? Their behavior, their stances… I am not saying American policy is not also caressing Serbia for certain interests, to pull it away from Russia. All of this is about cutting Serbia off from Russia. And to us they say, “Yes, yes, we are with you, but now Serbia is like this.” Meaning, they provoke Serbia, until Serbia provokes you in Banjska. And tomorrow again.
Anita Susuri: Mr. Agim, thank you…
Agim Gjakova: I tried to form, started to form, a party, but I saw it was impossible. I went to Dan Evers of the OSCE in the 2000s. He “enlightened” Albania, came to “enlighten” Kosovo, to put it in a well. I was one of his assistants. We argued; he couldn’t handle me. He said, “These things are not in my hands, Dan Evers controls them.” I told a young man who worked at the OSCE, “Come on, you must know these things.” He said, “Uncle Agim, I am here not to know.” In other words, they didn’t allow me to get involved at all. As I told you… what time is it now? (looks at watch) I’ve gone on too long.
As I told you, the politics of servants of foreign services… I know several cases. Since I was both an object and a subject of the state security, some of the security people later formed an idea about my integrity and dependency and told me some things. They said to me, “Do you know,” so-and-so? “Yes.” “He signed cooperation with the UDB in Montenegro,” they said, “in Andrijevica.” This one like this, that one like that, I knew some things. Then I also asked those who had belonged to the UDB of the Kosovo Secretariat of Internal Affairs. They had no choice but to tell me. They had no choice because I had known them since then.
Muharrem Dana, may he rest in peace, died. I asked him about three people. “Agim,” he said, “don’t ask me about them. Ask about someone else,” because there had been a service in Belgrade to which we had no access. He said, “Go ask them; they know where they sent these people around the world to stir up waters, to cause chaos.” So then I began working at the newspaper Bota Sot. They didn’t even know what editorial work meant. That foolish businessman called me and said, “Do you want to become director?” “Fine,” I said, “I’ll be director.”
I didn’t like it. For about eight months I was the director of the newspaper here. I organized some things, some sections, and so on. Then I fell out with him. He would publish everything blindly, without understanding what the press was. I told him, “Get lost, this can’t be done like this.” I left and retired. I founded PEN, as I told you.
Anita Susuri: All right, Mr. Agim, thank you very much for the interview and for your time, it was a pleasure.
Agim Gjakova: I drowned you with stories.
Anita Susuri: No, not at all.
Agim Gjakova: Eh?
Anita Susuri: No, no.
Agim Gjakova: All right.